Saudi Arabia has fighter jets, advanced missile-defence systems and one of the world’s biggest military budgets. Yet, as Houthi missiles and drones strike targets deep inside the kingdom, including Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport and the headquarters of oil giant Aramco in Dhahran, the limits of that formidable arsenal are becoming increasingly apparent.
On October 13, a ballistic missile reportedly struck an office tower within the Saudi Aramco complex in Dhahran, causing a limited fire. The attack followed a series of Houthi missile and drone strikes, including an assault on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh that killed people and disrupted flights. Saudi-led coalition forces have retaliated with airstrikes on Houthi facilities in Sanaa, including a fuel depot, while claiming to have destroyed missile launch platforms. The fighting has escalated after a period of relative calm under a ceasefire reached in 2022.
By October 14, Reuters reported repeated attacks on Riyadh and a strike on an Aramco administrative building in Dhahran. The kingdom’s air defences intercepted some incoming missiles, but falling debris still caused injuries and damage. Houthis have now threatened more attacks and asked civilians, international shipping companies and workers to evacuate Saudi airports and energy sites.
.The attacks, and the threats thereafter, have revealed a striking contrast. Saudi Arabia spent $83.2 billion on defence in 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Houthis, a Yemeni rebel movement with a fraction of the kingdom’s resources, have nevertheless developed an arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and long-range drones capable of threatening high-value targets.
The confrontation exposes a fundamental problem in modern warfare where a country can spend billions acquiring sophisticated weapons and still struggle to deter an adversary that relies on asymmetric tactics, dispersed launch sites and relatively inexpensive attack systems.
Saudi Arabia’s Billion-Dollar Arsenal
Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest importers of major weapons and a longstanding customer of the United States. SIPRI estimates that it accounted for 12% of US arms exports between 2021 and 2025. Its arsenal includes advanced combat aircraft, layered air-defence systems, surveillance radars and precision-guided munitions.
The F-15SA, an advanced variant of the American F-15 Eagle, is a central component of the Royal Saudi Air Force. It is a multirole combat aircraft capable of conducting air-to-air engagements and precision strikes against ground targets. Its advanced radar, electronic warfare equipment and weapons systems give Saudi Arabia a substantial advantage in conventional air power.
The MIM-104 Patriot, manufactured by US defence companies including RTX, is designed to intercept aircraft, cruise missiles and certain ballistic missiles. Its PAC-3 interceptor variants are specifically designed to engage tactical ballistic missile threats. Saudi Arabia has used Patriot systems to defend against missile attacks from Yemen, although the effectiveness of any interception depends on the threat, engagement conditions and available interceptor stocks.
The kingdom also operates the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system, designed to intercept ballistic missiles during the terminal phase of flight, including at high altitudes. Patriot and THAAD provide complementary layers of defence, rather than a guarantee that every incoming weapon will be stopped.
The scale of Saudi Arabia’s investment is further illustrated by a reported $9 billion agreement with Washington in 2026 for 730 Patriot missiles in a deal that the kingdom hopes will sustain an air-defence network when incoming threats continue to consume interceptors.
But even a sophisticated network has limits. Saudi Arabia is a vast country, with airports, oil installations, military bases and population centres spread across a large territory. Defending every potential target simultaneously requires extensive radar coverage, sufficient interceptor stocks and the ability to distinguish incoming threats quickly. The Houthis have been precisely exploiting this challenge.
Houthi Arsenal: Palestine-2, Toufan, Quds and More
The Houthis cannot match Saudi Arabia’s conventional air power, but their missile and drone capabilities have evolved considerably during years of conflict. Their arsenal includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and one-way attack drones, allowing them to threaten targets at different distances and from different directions.
Among the systems associated with the group are:
Palestine-2: A long-range ballistic missile that the Houthis claim can travel more than 2,000 kilometres. The group’s stated specifications have not all been independently verified.
Toufan: A ballistic missile generally assessed to be based on Iranian missile technology, with estimated range varying by variant.
Burkan and Badr missile families: Systems associated with the Houthis’ missile arsenal, with different variants and capabilities.
Quds cruise missiles: A family of cruise missiles associated with Iranian designs, capable of flying at lower altitudes than many ballistic missiles and presenting different detection challenges.
Long-range attack drones: Unmanned aircraft used for one-way strikes against military, energy and other infrastructure targets.
The exact weapon used in each recent attack on Saudi Arabia has not been independently established in all cases. The significance lies in the breadth of the Houthi arsenal and its capacity to sustain repeated threats, rather than in assuming that every attack involves the most advanced missile attributed to the group.
Where Do Houthis Get Their Weapons?
Iran is central to the story, but the supply chain is more complicated than the direct transfer of finished missiles. The Houthis have developed their capabilities through a combination of weapons inherited from Yemen’s former state military, locally assembled systems, smuggling networks and access to Iranian-designed technology and technical expertise. UN investigations and other arms-tracking research have documented Iranian-origin components and similarities between Houthi systems and Iranian weapons. Tehran has denied supplying the Houthis with weapons in the manner alleged by its opponents.
A report published by the Associated Press on October 15, citing the UK-based Conflict Armament Research group, said the Houthis were seeking to develop a medium-range ballistic missile using components sourced from Chinese suppliers. Yemeni authorities had intercepted two shipments of missile components intended for Hodeidah, including rocket parts and heat-shield materials. The emerging evidence suggests the group is diversifying its procurement networks while developing greater capacity to assemble weapons locally. It does not, by itself, establish that the Chinese government supplied the weapons or knowingly authorised their transfer.
This evolution matters for Saudi Arabia. Destroying a particular launch site or weapons depot may temporarily reduce the threat, but it does not necessarily eliminate the supply chains, technical knowledge and local manufacturing capacity that can regenerate it.
Cheaper Arsenal Vs An Expensive Defence System
The central imbalance is economic. A relatively inexpensive drone can force the defender to activate radar networks, mobilise aircraft or launch an interceptor worth far more than the attacking weapon. Costs vary widely by system, and not every threat requires an expensive response. But repeated barrages can place pressure on ammunition stocks, operational readiness and the coverage of defensive systems.
The Houthis also benefit from being able to choose when and where to attack. Saudi Arabia must defend a wide range of possible targets, while the attackers can concentrate their resources on selected locations. Even when a missile is intercepted, debris can still cause damage or injuries on the ground.
The recent attacks on Riyadh’s airport and the Aramco complex in Dhahran underline the stakes. These are not merely military installations. While airports are central to commercial travel and Saudi Arabia’s ambition to become a global aviation and tourism hub, oil infrastructure underpins the kingdom’s economy and its role in global energy markets. Threats to either can have consequences well beyond the immediate damage.
This does not mean Saudi air defences are ineffective. The kingdom has intercepted incoming missiles and drones, and its arsenal gives it substantial capacity to strike back. The problem is that a high interception rate is not the same as complete protection, particularly when attacks are repeated, and the number of potential targets is large.
The Houthis have therefore found a way to impose strategic costs without matching Saudi Arabia weapon for weapon. Their success lies in keeping the threat credible and making the defence of the kingdom expensive and operationally demanding.
The Saudi Dilemma: Retaliate Harder Or Risk Wider War?
Saudi Arabia has the ability to intensify its military campaign. Its fighter aircraft can strike Houthi launch sites, depots and infrastructure, while intelligence and surveillance capabilities can help identify targets. But the kingdom’s experience in Yemen offers a warning about the limits of air power.
Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen in 2015 in support of the internationally recognised government, seeking to reverse the Houthi takeover of Sanaa. Years of military operations did not dislodge the rebels from the capital or eliminate their ability to threaten Saudi territory. A UN-brokered truce in 2022 brought a period of relative calm, although it did not resolve the underlying conflict.
A renewed offensive now could degrade Houthi capabilities, but it could also provoke more missile and drone attacks on Saudi targets. The kingdom would then face the need to defend its infrastructure while sustaining an expanded military campaign. Escalation could also threaten shipping and energy flows across the region.
That creates a difficult calculation for Riyadh. A limited response risks signalling that attacks can continue without a sufficiently high price. A larger campaign may demonstrate resolve, but it could also trigger retaliation that damages the very infrastructure Saudi Arabia is trying to protect.
Iran’s role complicates the picture further. The Houthis have benefited from Iranian-designed technology and expertise, but treating every Houthi action as a direct order from Tehran would oversimplify the relationship. Riyadh must account for the regional consequences of escalation without assuming that military pressure on the Houthis will necessarily resolve its broader tensions with Iran.
Nor does Saudi Arabia’s security partnership with Washington guarantee direct American intervention in every confrontation. Access to advanced weapons and military cooperation strengthens the kingdom’s capabilities, but it cannot eliminate the need for Riyadh to make its own strategic decisions.
The Houthi attacks do not establish that the rebels are militarily superior to Saudi Arabia, but it demonstrates that military superiority does not automatically translate into deterrence. Saudi Arabia can strike targets in Yemen, yet it cannot assume that doing so will prevent the Houthis from launching further attacks. The rebels’ missile and drone capabilities, their dispersed infrastructure and their ability to draw on external technology make the threat difficult to eliminate through force alone.
Saudi Arabia’s predicament is stark. It has spent billions acquiring some of the world’s most sophisticated military systems, but it faces an adversary that can exploit the limits of those systems without matching their cost or complexity. The Houthis, on the other hand, do not need to defeat Saudi Arabia’s arsenal. All they need is to make the kingdom question whether using it more aggressively will deliver the security it is meant to guarantee.